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Abstract
The ethical constraints forced on an investment fund satisfy the fulfilment of
humanitarian aims but may lower the investment profitability. Hence, when we measure
the performance of ethical mutual funds we cannot disregard the ethical component.
In this contribution we propose a performance indicator which considers the expected
return, the investment risk, the ethical component and the subscription and redemption
costs together. The performance measure proposed is obtained using a DEA approach,
which allows to measure the relative efficiency of decision making units in presence of a
multiple input-multiple output structure.
The DEA performance indicator for ethical funds can be computed with different
models, according to the nature of the ethical indicator which characterizes the socially
responsible funds. In particular, a DEA model with exogenously fixed output variables
and a categorical variable model seem appropriate.
Keywords: Finance; Data envelopment analysis; Mutual fund performance indexes;
Ethical funds
1. Introduction
Ethical or socially responsible investments are playing an increasing role
among the financial investments, thanks to their ability to marry profitability
and social engagement together.
One of the main instruments of ethical finance is given by ethical mutual
funds. These mutual funds allow investors to impose some constraints to the fund
management, based on ethical principles. For example, a “socially responsible”
constraint of this kind can be represented by the engagement to refrain from buying
shares of companies involved in the weapon industry or in polluting activities.
Other ethical objectives which can be pursued by ethical mutual funds are the
engage to support non profit organizations, philanthropic institutions or special
social activities.
Of course, the imposition of ethical constraints, while satisfying the fulfilment
of humanitarian aims, may well lower the overall profitability of the investment.
∗ Partially supported by M.U.R.S.T., Research program of national interest “Models for the
management of financial, insurance and operations risks”.
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Therefore, when we analyze the performance of ethical mutual funds we cannot
disregard the ethical component and take into account solely the portfolio return
and risk.
However, the traditional numerical indexes used to measure the performance
of mutual funds do not allow to take account of the ethical aspect. In particular,
the Sharpe ratio (Sharpe, 1966), the reward-to-half-variance index (Ang and Chua,
1979) and the Treynor index (Treynor, 1965) are computed as ratios between the
expected excess return and a risk indicator and cannot consider additional features,
neither can Jensen index (Jensen, 1968).
In this contribution we try to define a performance indicator which considers
simultaneously the various aspects of the portfolio performance, namely the
investment return and risk, on the one hand, and the ethical behaviour on the
other hand. Moreover, the performance measure proposed can take into account
also the subscription and redemption costs, which contribute to determine the
overall performance of the investment.
The performance measure proposed is obtained using a data envelopment
analysis (DEA) approach, which is an operational research methodology
introduced by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978, 1979) that allows to measure
the relative efficiency of decision making units in presence of a multiple input-
multiple output structure.
Recently the DEA technique has been geared to the problem of mutual fund
performance evaluation by Murthi, Choi and Desai (1997) and Basso and Funari
(2001). The DEA mutual fund performance indexes obtained by Murthi, Choi and
Desai and Basso and Funari permit to compare the investment fund efficiency not
only on the basis of the fund return and risk, but also on the basis of the investment
costs (subscription costs and redemption fees). In addition, different risk measures
can be taken into account together; it is also possible to include in the analysis
a stochastic dominance indicator that reflects the investor’s preferences and the
occurrence of the returns (Basso and Funari, 2001).
Another application of the philosophy of the DEA approaches to the
mutual fund performance appraisal is proposed by Morey and Morey (1999) to
simultaneously consider the fund risks and returns measured over different time
horizons.
A first direct generalization of the DEA mutual fund performance indexes
proposed in the literature suggests to exploit the multiple input-multiple output
structure of a DEA model by adding among the outputs the ethical level indicator.
Of course, in order to be able to make such an addition one must have at his
disposal a rating ethical indicator which measures the social responsibility level.
However, the nature of the ethical indicator may often be such that a basic
DEA model is not appropriate. In particular, this is the case when the ethical level
is exogenously fixed and, therefore, is not under the control of managers. The same
happens when the ethical indicator assigns to each fund an integer number or a
character label which identifies the ethical category; in this case the ethical level
represents a non-controllable categorical variable which may take a discrete set of
values put on an ordinal scale.
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Hence, two additional DEA models are presented in the paper which enable
to deal with the particular nature of the ethical indicator. The first model is
appropriate in the case of an exogenously fixed ethical level, whereas the second
one assumes that the ethical level represents a categorical variable.
If we do not have at our disposal an indicator of the ethical level of mutual
funds, finally, it is still possible to define a DEA model for the valuation of
the performance of mutual funds which at least takes into account the binary
information on the ethical/non-ethical nature of a fund.
Lastly, in order to test the operational effectiveness and compare the
differences in the performance measures computed with the various models
proposed we have carried out an empirical analysis on a set of randomly generated
mutual funds.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the DEA technique
and the basic DEA model. In Section 3 we summarize the DEA measures for
the mutual fund performance evaluation proposed in the literature. Sections 4
to 6 present the different DEA models for the performance evaluation of ethical
mutual funds. In particular, Section 4 introduces the basic generalization which
considers the ethical measure as an additional output, Section 5 presents the
model for the case in which the ethical level is considered as exogenously fixed
and Section 6 presents the DEA categorical models for ethical mutual funds, both
in its binary and multiple categories cases. Section 7 discusses the results of the
empirical application and, finally, Section 8 summarizes some concluding remarks.
An Appendix reports the proofs of the theoretical results concerning the various
models presented.
2. The basic DEA model
Let us introduce the basic DEA model originally proposed by Charnes, Cooper
and Rhodes (1978). This model focuses on the analysis of the relative efficiency of
a set of decision making units which may represent schools, universities, hospitals,
public agencies, banks, stores and so on. All these units require some inputs and
in return supply some outputs.
Let us introduce the following notation:
j = 1, 2, . . . , n decision making units
r = 1, 2, . . . , t outputs
i = 1, 2, . . . ,m inputs
yrj amount of output r for unit j
xij amount of input i for unit j
ur weight assigned to output r
vi weight assigned to input i.
The DEA efficiency measure is essentially defined as the ratio of a weighted
sum of outputs to a weighted sum of inputs. Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes’s idea
is to define the efficiency measure by assigning to each decision making unit the
most favourable weights. These optimal weights are computed by maximizing the
efficiency ratio of the unit considered, provided that the efficiency ratios of all
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units, computed with the same weights, have an upper bound (usually set equal
to 1).
Therefore, the DEA efficiency measure for the decision making unit j0 ∈
{ 1, 2, . . . , n } can be found by solving the following optimization problem
max
{vi,ur}
∑t
r=1 uryrj0∑m
i=1 vixij0
(2.1)
subject to ∑t
r=1 uryrj∑m
i=1 vixij
≤ 1 j = 1, 2, . . . , n
ur ≥ ε r = 1, 2, . . . , t
vi ≥ ε i = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
(2.2)
where ε is a convenient small positive number – formally, a non-archimedean
constant – that prevents the weights from vanishing (see Charnes, Cooper and
Rhodes, 1979, and Charnes, Cooper, Lewin and Seiford, 1994).
The optimal objective function value (2.1) is taken as the efficiency measure
assigned to unit j0. Of course, to find the efficiency measures of the other decision
making units we have to solve similar problems, targeted on each unit in turn.
Note that the efficiency measure have an upper bound of 1, which will be
reached only by the most efficient units.
The DEA model (2.1)-(2.2) is written as a fractional linear programming
problem but can be conveniently converted into an equivalent linear programming
problem. By letting
∑m
i=1 vixij0 = 1 we obtain the so called input-oriented CCR
(Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes) linear model
max
t∑
r=1
uryrj0 (2.3)
subject to
m∑
i=1
vixij0 = 1
t∑
r=1
uryrj −
m∑
i=1
vixij ≤ 0 j = 1, 2, . . . , n
− ur ≤ −ε r = 1, 2, . . . , t
− vi ≤ −ε i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
(2.4)
The dual of problem (2.3)-(2.4) permits to identify a set of efficient units,
called peer units, which are efficient with the inefficient unit’s weights. These peer
units are associated with the (strictly) positive basic multipliers in the optimal
solution and provide a target for unit j0 (see for example Boussofiane, Dyson and
Thanassoulis, 1991).
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Alternatively, we may set
∑t
r=1 uryrj0 = 1, thus obtaining the so called
output-oriented CCR linear model
min
m∑
i=1
vixij0 (2.5)
subject to
t∑
r=1
uryrj0 = 1
m∑
i=1
vixij −
t∑
r=1
uryrj ≥ 0 j = 1, 2, . . . , n
ur ≥ ε r = 1, 2, . . . , t
vi ≥ ε i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
(2.6)
3. DEA measures for mutual fund performance
The DEA technique has recently been used to evaluate the performance
of mutual funds by Murthi, Choi and Desai (1997), Morey and Morey (1999)
and Basso and Funari (2001). In fact, the DEA methodology may be used to
define mutual fund performance indexes that take into account several inputs, in
particular different risk measures and subscription and redemption costs.
The investment cost is a relevant aspect in measuring the performance of an
investment. Nevertheless, the traditional numerical indexes widely used in the
literature do not allow to take into account the subscription and redemption costs
usually required by an investment in mutual fund portfolios. This is the case, for
example, if we consider the reward-to-volatility ratio (Sharpe, 1966), the reward-
to-half-variance index (Ang and Chua, 1979) and the reward-to-variability ratio
(Treynor, 1965), which are all ratios between the expected excess return and a
different risk indicator; the same happens with the Jensen index (Jensen, 1968)
that measures the portfolio performance by means of the intercept of a linear
regression in the C.A.P.M. framework.
A first mutual fund efficiency measure which applies the DEA methodology
is the DPEI index developed by Murthi, Choi and Desai (1997); it considers
the mutual fund return as output and the standard deviation and transaction
costs as inputs, together with operational expenses, management fees, markets
and administrative expenses and a trading turnover ratio.
The IDEA−1 index proposed by Basso and Funari (2001) can be seen, in a
sense, as a generalization of DPEI which allows to consider different risk measures,
though there exist slight differences with regard to the transaction costs taken into
consideration. In particular, IDEA−1 takes into account only the subscription costs
and redemption fees that directly burden the investors but not the other expenses
that have already been deducted from the fund quotations.
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Let us consider a set of n mutual funds j = 1, 2, . . . , n with risky returns Rj
and introduce the following notation:
oj a return measure of fund j
q1j , . . . , qhj h risk measures for fund j
c1j , . . . , ckj k subscription and/or redemption costs for fund j
u weight assigned to the return measure oj
vi weight assigned to the risk measure i (i = 1, 2, ..., h)
wi weight assigned to the cost i (i = 1, 2, ..., k).
As output, the model considers a return measure, which can be either the
expected return E(Rj) or the expected excess return E(Rj) − δ, where δ is the
riskless rate of return.
As inputs, it considers some risk measures and the subscription and
redemption costs. In particular, among the risk measures one can include
the standard deviation of the return σj =
√
V ar(Rj), the root of the half-
variance risk indicator HVj = E (min [Rj − E(Rj), 0])2, and the β coefficient
βj = Cov(Rj , Rm)/V ar(Rm), where Rm denotes the market portfolio return.
The DEA performance index of mutual fund investments for fund j0,
Ij0,DEA−1, is computed as the optimal objective function value of the following
DEA problem
max
{u,vi,wi}
uoj0∑h
i=1 viqij0 +
∑k
i=1 wicij0
(3.1)
subject to
uoj∑h
i=1 viqij +
∑k
i=1 wicij
≤ 1 j = 1, 2, . . . , n
u ≥ ε
vi ≥ ε i = 1, 2, . . . , h
wi ≥ ε i = 1, 2, . . . , k.
(3.2)
If we let an asterisk denotes the optimal values of the variables, we have
Ij0,DEA−1 =
u∗oj0∑h
i=1 v
∗
i qij0 +
∑k
i=1 w
∗
i cij0
. (3.3)
Equation (3.3) suggests that the IDEA−1 index generalizes the traditional Sharpe,
Treynor and reward-to-half-variance indexes, which may be seen as ratios between
the expected excess return (an output) and a different risk indicator (an input).
In effect, Basso and Funari (2001) show that with the excess return as output
and the standard deviation of the return as the only input considered – so that
the entrance and exit investment costs are omitted – then the IDEA−1 efficiency
index coincides with the Sharpe ratio multiplied by a normalization constant which
scales it off in the interval [0,1]. Analogously, by taking as risk measure either the
root of the half-variance or the β coefficient we get the reward-to-half-variance and
the Treynor indexes, respectively.
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The DEA efficiency measure IDEA−1 exhibits some interesting properties
discussed in Basso and Funari (2001). A first property concerns the length of
the investment horizon. It is known that the traditional performance indexes are
sensitive to the assumed investment horizon, since we may get different results
according to the data frequency, i.e. the time interval (week, month, year...) to
which the portfolio returns refer. Hence, a systematic bias could be observed if
the index is computed by assuming a holding period which is different from the
one chosen by the investors; see Levy (1972) for the Sharpe index and Levhari
and Levy (1977) for the Treynor and Jensen performance measures. On the other
hand, if logarithmic returns are used and under the assumption of stationarity and
independence of the returns over time, it can be shown that the DEA efficiency
measure IDEA−1 is invariant with respect to the investment horizon chosen.
Another useful property of the DEA approach follows from the solution of
the dual problem, which allows to suggest to the inefficient units a “virtual unit”
that they could imitate in order to improve their efficiency, as it is efficient with
the inefficient unit’s weights. From a financial point of view, this composite unit
could be considered as a target benchmark for the inefficient fund j0. Fund j0
could improve its performance by trying to imitate the behaviour of the efficient
composite unit, which has an input/output orientation which is similar to that of
the (inefficient) fund j0. Notice that this benchmark portfolio is a “fund of funds”
which can actually be purchased (Morey and Morey, 1999).
4. A basic DEA model for ethical funds
A first step in order to take into account not only the risk and return (and
eventually the costs) of the mutual fund investment but also the fulfillment of
ethical aims, could be to define a measure of the social responsibility level. In
effect, there are now some attempts to define rating indicators which divide the
funds into categories on the basis of the restrictions, more or less stringent, imposed
to the fund management by the ethical constraints.
Let ej denote the ethical measure for fund j (j = 1, 2, . . . , n) and let us
assume that it represents a non negative real number. Then it would be easy
to generalize the DEA mutual fund performance measure IDEA−1 by adding a
second output: besides the expected return measure oj , we can easily introduce
the ethical measure ej among the outputs. In this way we can compute the basic
DEA measure for ethical mutual fund performance, IDEA−E , for fund j0 as follows
Ij0,DEA−E =
u∗1oj0 + u
∗
2ej0∑h
i=1 v
∗
i qij0 +
∑k
i=1 w
∗
i cij0
, (4.1)
where u1 is the weight assigned to the return measure oj , u2 is the weight assigned
to the ethical measure ej and the asterisk characterizes the optimal solution of the
following two-output DEA problem
max
{ur,vi,wi}
u1oj0 + u2ej0∑h
i=1 viqij0 +
∑k
i=1 wicij0
(4.2)
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subject to
u1oj + u2ej∑h
i=1 viqij +
∑k
i=1 wicij
≤ 1 j = 1, 2, . . . , n
ur ≥ ε r = 1, 2
vi ≥ ε i = 1, 2, . . . , h
wi ≥ ε i = 1, 2, . . . , k.
(4.3)
It is easy to see the relation which connects the one-output performance
measure IDEA−1 with the two-output measure IDEA−E . In fact, by adding an
output indicator in a DEA efficiency measurement problem we can only improve
the efficiency score, so that the following proposition holds.
Proposition 1. Let Ij0,DEA−1 be the DEA performance index (3.3) and
Ij0,DEA−E the basic DEA measure for ethical mutual fund performance (4.1);
we have
Ij0,DEA−1 ≤ Ij0,DEA−E . (4.4)
The proof of Proposition 1 is reported in the Appendix.
Moreover, it could be natural to choose an ethical measure which assigns the
ethical funds a strictly positive number while the measure assigned to the non-
ethical funds is set equal to zero. In this case, it can be shown that the value of
the ethical performance index IDEA−E for the non-ethical funds will coincide with
the value of IDEA−1.
Proposition 2. Let Ij0,DEA−1 be the DEA performance index (3.3) and
Ij0,DEA−E the basic DEA measure for ethical mutual fund performance (4.1);
if ej0 = 0 and ej ≥ 0 for all j we have
Ij0,DEA−1 = Ij0,DEA−E . (4.5)
The proof of Proposition 2 is reported in the Appendix.
5. An exogenously fixed output DEA model for ethical funds
Nevertheless, the ethical level of the investments in a socially responsible fund
is often chosen by investors a priori and cannot be arbitrarily modified; the output
ej can therefore be considered as exogenously fixed, beyond the discretionary
control of managers. On the other hand, the virtual unit suggested by the basic
DEA technique as efficient benchmark for an inefficient unit could have an ethical
level different from the one chosen by investors.
To avoid this inconvenient, when the analysis includes fixed variables (either
inputs or outputs) the basic DEA model has to be conveniently modified. To this
aim, Banker and Morey (1986a) suggest to keep the level of the exogenously fixed
variables constant at their current value: only the value of the discretionary or
controllable variables should be modified by the DEA programs.
8
We may apply to the performance measurement of ethical mutual funds
a model analogous to the one suggested by Banker and Morey (1986a) for
exogenously fixed outputs. With respect to the original Banker and Morey’s model
we have only relaxed the convexity constraint, which could be overcome in the case
of investment funds.
The changes suggested by Banker and Morey to keep constant the level of
the non-controllable output can be applied to the dual of the linear programming
problem written in an output-oriented form. We obtain the following model:
max z0 + ε
h∑
i=1
s−i + ε
k∑
i=1
s−h+i + εs
+
1 (5.1)
subject to
n∑
j=1
qijλj + s−i = qij0 i = 1, 2, . . . , h
n∑
j=1
cijλj + s−h+i = cij0 i = 1, 2, . . . , k
z0 oj0 −
n∑
j=1
ojλj + s+1 = 0
−
n∑
j=1
ejλj + s+2 = −ej0
λj ≥ 0 j = 1, 2, . . . , n
s−i ≥ 0 i = 1, 2, . . . , h+ k
s+r ≥ 0 r = 1, 2,
(5.2)
where z0 is the dual variable associated with the equality constraint, λj are the dual
variables associated with the mutual funds constraints and s−i and s
+
r are the dual
variables connected with the input and output weight constraints, respectively.
The primal of the dual problem (5.1)-(5.2) leads to the following DEA
fractional programming problem
max
{ur,vi,wi}
u1oj0∑h
i=1 viqij0 +
∑k
i=1 wicij0 − u2ej0
(5.3)
subject to
u1oj∑h
i=1 viqij +
∑k
i=1 wicij − u2ej
≤ 1 j = 1, 2, . . . , n
u1 ≥ ε, u2 ≥ 0
vi ≥ ε i = 1, . . . , h
wi ≥ ε i = 1, 2, . . . , k.
(5.4)
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The performance measure when the ethical level is assumed uncontrollable,
IDEA−U , is given by the optimal value of the objective function (5.3) or,
equivalently, by the inverse of the optimal value of z0 in problem (5.1)-(5.2).
One can wonder the effect on the performance measure of fixing the value of
the uncontrollable ethical level. In effect, it can be proved that the non-controllable
case performance measure IDEA−U has a value less than or equal to the value of
the basic DEA index IDEA−E .
Proposition 3. Let Ij0,DEA−U be the optimal value of the DEA problem (5.3)-
(5.4) and Ij0,DEA−E the basic performance index (4.1); we have
Ij0,DEA−U ≤ Ij0,DEA−E . (5.5)
The proof of Proposition 3 is reported in the Appendix.
Moreover, it can be shown that if the non-ethical funds are assigned a null
ethical measure (ej = 0), then for the non-ethical funds the non-controllable case
performance measure IDEA−U coincides with the value of the DEA index IDEA−E .
Proposition 4. Let Ij0,DEA−U be the optimal value of the DEA problem (5.3)-
(5.4) and Ij0,DEA−E the basic performance index (4.1); if ej0 = 0 we have
Ij0,DEA−U = Ij0,DEA−E . (5.6)
The proof of Proposition 4 is reported in the Appendix.
6. DEA categorical models for ethical funds
Sometimes, the rating of the socially responsible mutual funds is carried out by
dividing the funds into categories of gradually increasing ethical level; the various
categories are usually marked with either an integer number or a character label.
In such a case, the ethical indicator cannot be considered as a real measure; it is
instead a non-controllable categorical variable with a discrete set of values put on
an ordinal scale.
The presence of non-controllable categorical variables does not recommend the
use of a basic DEA model. The reason lies in the fact that the virtual composite
unit suggested by the basic DEA technique as efficient benchmark could well have
an ethical level defined as it were measured on an interval scale, with a value which
has no correspondence with any of the existing categories.
Efficiency analyses in presence of non-controllable categorical variables are
well known in the DEA literature. Two implementations are given by a
performance analysis of pharmacies carried out by Banker and Morey (1986b),
in which the pharmacies were divided into categories according to the size of their
market (population served), and a study of Cooper, Seiford and Tone (2000) on
the relative efficiency of the public libraries in Tokio; the libraries were classified
into categories according to the kind of the area covered (business, shopping and
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residential areas; the third category has the greatest advantage while the first one
is at a disadvantage).
The idea with categorical variables is to modify the basic DEA model in order
to ensure that the virtual unit suggested as efficient benchmark includes only units
which have the same or lower values of the categorical variables. In the ethical
mutual fund analysis, the ordinal scale can be defined in such a way: the non-
ethical funds are considered as having an advantage, while as the ethical level
increases the ethical funds are considered as more and more in a disadvantage as
they have to meet more ethical requirements.
In order to exclude the funds that are “less ethical” from the peer group
we can define p − 1 binary variables, where p is the number of categories (p − 1
categories classifies the ethical funds and one indicates the non-ethical funds).
To understand the functioning of the model let us first introduce the simple
binary case of two ethical categories (ethical/non-ethical funds) and let us define
a binary variable d as follows
dj =
{
0 if fund j is ethical
1 if fund j is not ethical. (6.1)
This binary categorical case, furthermore, answers our purpose in the not
infrequent case in which we do not have at our disposal an indicator of the ethical
level of mutual funds but only have the binary information on the ethical/non-
ethical nature of a fund.
An appropriate categorical DEA model for the binary ethical/non-ethical case
is
max z0 + ε
h∑
i=1
s−i + ε
k∑
i=1
s−h+i + εs
+
1 (6.2)
subject to
n∑
j=1
qijλj + s−i = qij0 i = 1, 2, . . . , h
n∑
j=1
cijλj + s−h+i = cij0 i = 1, 2, . . . , k
z0 oj0 −
n∑
j=1
ojλj + s+1 = 0
n∑
j=1
q1j
q1j0
djλj ≤ dj0
λj ≥ 0 j = 1, 2, . . . , n
s−i ≥ 0 i = 1, 2, . . . , h+ k
s+1 ≥ 0.
(6.3)
Observe that the binary categorical model (6.2)-(6.3) is similar to the non-
controllable output model (5.1)-(5.2): the only difference is given by the constraint
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on the ethical measure ej , −
∑n
j=1 ejλj + s
+
2 = −ej0 , which is substituted with a
constraint involving the ethical categorical variable dj
n∑
j=1
q1j
q1j0
djλj ≤ dj0 . (6.4)
Let us analyze in detail this constraint. For the non-ethical funds (dj0 = 1)
constraint (6.4) is redundant since
n∑
j=1
q1j
q1j0
djλj ≤
n∑
j=1
q1j
q1j0
λj ≤ 1, (6.5)
where the last inequality follows from the first of constraints (6.3). Of course,
in order to write constraint (6.4) for any fund j0 the first risk measure must be
strictly positive (q1j > 0 for all j). On the contrary, for the ethical funds (dj0 = 0)
constraint (6.4) requires that the multipliers associated to the non-ethical funds
are zero (λj = 0 if dj = 1). Note that if the additional convexity constraint∑n
j=1 λj = 1 is imposed, as in Banker and Morey (1986b), then constraint (6.4) is
equivalent to the simpler inequality
∑n
j=1 djλj ≤ dj0 .
If the mutual funds are classified into more than two ethical categories, as is
the case, for example, if we consider non-ethical funds and ethical funds with social
responsibility levels 1 (low), 2 (average) and 3 (high), a single ethical constraint
is not sufficient. Let us define three binary variables d(1), d(2), d(3) as follows
Fund category d(1)j d
(2)
j d
(3)
j
Non-ethical 1 1 1
Ethical level 1 1 1 0
Ethical level 2 1 0 0
Ethical level 3 0 0 0
The categorical DEA model for multiple ethical categories requires the
introduction of 3 (in general, p− 1) ethical constraints and can be written as
max z0 + ε
h∑
i=1
s−i + ε
k∑
i=1
s−h+i + εs
+
1 (6.6)
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subject to
n∑
j=1
qijλj + s−i = qij0 i = 1, 2, . . . , h
n∑
j=1
cijλj + s−h+i = cij0 i = 1, 2, . . . , k
z0 oj0 −
n∑
j=1
ojλj + s+1 = 0
n∑
j=1
q1j
q1j0
d
(a)
j λj ≤ d(a)j0 a = 1, 2, 3
λj ≥ 0 j = 1, 2, . . . , n
s−i ≥ 0 i = 1, 2, . . . , h+ k
s+1 ≥ 0.
(6.7)
Let us point out that with the categorical models (6.2)-(6.3) and (6.6)-(6.7)
we can still have virtual units with an ethical level which does not correspond to
any category, but an ethical mutual fund is now compared only to funds which are
at least socially responsible as itself, and this should give rise to a fairer evaluation
process.
We will denote the performance measure for an ethical categorical variable by
IDEA−C in the multiple categories case and IDEA−B in the binary ethical/non-
ethical case; this performance measure is computed as the inverse of the optimal
value of z0 of problem (6.6)-(6.7) or (6.2)-(6.3), respectively.
An interesting property of invariance of the efficiency measure can be shown
for the non-ethical funds.
Proposition 5. Let Ij0,DEA−C be the inverse of the optimal value of z0 in the
DEA problem (6.6)-(6.7), Ij0,DEA−U the optimal value of the DEA problem (5.3)-
(5.4) and Ij0,DEA−E the basic performance index (4.1); if ej0 = 0 and d
(a)
j = 1 ∀ a
we have
Ij0,DEA−C = Ij0,DEA−U = Ij0,DEA−E . (6.8)
The proof of Proposition 5 is reported in the Appendix.
As concerns the comparison between the binary and the multiple categories
cases, we can state the following result.
Proposition 6. Let Ij0,DEA−B and Ij0,DEA−C be the inverse of the optimal value
of z0 in the DEA problems (6.2)-(6.3) and (6.6)-(6.7), respectively; then
Ij0,DEA−B ≤ Ij0,DEA−C ; (6.9)
moreover, for the non-ethical funds we have
Ij0,DEA−B = Ij0,DEA−C . (6.10)
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The proof of Proposition 6 is reported in the Appendix.
7. An empirical application
In order to test the applicability of the different DEA models proposed to treat
the measurement of the performance of ethical mutual funds, we have applied these
models to a set of 50 randomly generated mutual funds.
The inputs considered in the empirical analysis are three brackets of
subscription costs (per cent subscription cost relative to 5 000, 25 000 and 50 000
dollars of initial investment), three brackets of redemption costs (per cent
redemption cost assuming a length of investment period of 1, 2 and 3 years,
respectively) and two risk measures given by the standard deviation of the fund
return σj and the β coefficient.
The two outputs considered are the expected return E(Rj) and an ethical
indicator ej which takes integer values in the range 0 to 3: a 0 level marks the
non-ethical funds while a strictly positive integer denotes the ethical level of the
socially responsible funds. The one-output DEA model (3.1)-(3.2) disregards the
ethical indicator ej , in the basic DEA model (4.2)-(4.3) and in the exogenously
fixed output model (5.1)-(5.2) it represents the ethical measure and in the DEA
categorical model (6.6)-(6.7) it is considered as a categorical variable. For the
binary categorical model (6.2)-(6.3) the ethical variable dj has been defined as
dj = 0 if ej = 0 and dj = 1 if ej > 0.
The first 30 funds are non-ethical, whereas the last 20 have an ethical nature
as follows: 6 funds have ethical measure 1, 7 have ethical measure 2 and 7 have
ethical measure 3. The values of the other input and output variables of each
fund have been generated with a Monte Carlo technique either as a normal or as
a uniform random variable, on a likely basis which simulates the behaviour of a
real market.
Table 1 shows the performance measures IDEA−1, IDEA−E , IDEA−U ,
IDEA−C , IDEA−B obtained for the 50 mutual funds analyzed, together with the
consequent relative ranking.
We know from Propositions 1-6 that the performance measures IDEA−1,
IDEA−E , IDEA−U , IDEA−C , IDEA−B for a non-ethical fund coincide while for
the ethical funds we only know that both IDEA−1 and IDEA−U are less than or
equal to IDEA−E while IDEA−B ≤ IDEA−C . The results displayed in Table 1
highlight these properties; moreover, for the ethical funds the empirical results
show that any relation can hold between IDEA−C and IDEA−E , on the one hand,
and between IDEA−U and IDEA−C on the other hand. In fact, from Table 1 we
observe the following inequalities for the ethical funds F39, F46 and F47
I39,DEA−U < I39,DEA−B < I39,DEA−C < I39,DEA−E
I46,DEA−B < I46,DEA−C < I46,DEA−U = I46,DEA−E
I47,DEA−B < I47,DEA−U < I47,DEA−E < I47,DEA−C .
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Table 1 Empirical results obtained for 50 simulated mutual funds; the first 30 funds are not
ethical, the last 20 are ethical funds. The table reports the performance measure obtained with
the different DEA models presented in the paper and the relative ranking (in italics).
Ethical
Funds level IDEA−1 IDEA−E IDEA−U IDEA−C IDEA−B
F1 0 0.804 12 0.805 20 0.805 17 0.805 15 0.805 14
F2 0 0.104 47 0.104 50 0.104 49 0.104 48 0.104 48
F3 0 0.480 30 0.480 38 0.480 33 0.480 32 0.480 31
F4 0 0.971 6 0.971 14 0.971 11 0.971 12 0.971 11
F5 0 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1
F6 0 0.613 23 0.613 32 0.613 26 0.613 25 0.613 24
F7 0 0.907 9 0.907 15 0.907 12 0.907 13 0.907 12
F8 0 0.729 16 0.729 25 0.729 19 0.729 19 0.729 18
F9 0 0.705 17 0.705 27 0.705 21 0.705 21 0.705 20
F10 0 0.569 25 0.569 34 0.569 28 0.569 28 0.569 28
F11 0 0.684 18 0.684 28 0.684 23 0.684 22 0.684 21
F12 0 0.455 31 0.455 39 0.455 34 0.455 33 0.455 32
F13 0 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1
F14 0 0.557 26 0.557 36 0.557 30 0.557 29 0.557 29
F15 0 0.452 32 0.452 40 0.452 35 0.452 34 0.452 33
F16 0 0.403 37 0.403 44 0.403 40 0.403 39 0.403 38
F17 0 0.154 44 0.154 48 0.154 47 0.154 46 0.154 45
F18 0 0.118 46 0.118 49 0.118 48 0.118 47 0.118 47
F19 0 0.759 15 0.759 24 0.759 18 0.759 17 0.759 16
F20 0 0.285 41 0.285 47 0.285 44 0.285 42 0.285 41
F21 0 0.407 35 0.407 42 0.407 37 0.407 36 0.407 35
F22 0 0.411 34 0.411 41 0.411 36 0.411 35 0.411 34
F23 0 0.405 36 0.405 43 0.405 38 0.405 37 0.405 36
F24 0 0.571 24 0.571 33 0.571 27 0.571 27 0.571 27
F25 0 0.883 10 0.883 18 0.883 14 0.883 14 0.883 13
F26 0 0.330 38 0.330 46 0.330 43 0.330 41 0.330 40
F27 0 0.652 20 0.652 30 0.652 24 0.652 23 0.652 22
F28 0 0.527 27 0.527 37 0.527 32 0.527 30 0.527 30
F29 0 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1
F30 0 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1
F31 1 0.649 21 0.673 29 0.649 25 0.712 20 0.712 19
F32 1 0.794 13 0.887 17 0.876 15 1.000 1 1.000 1
F33 1 0.809 11 0.895 16 0.885 13 1.000 1 1.000 1
F34 1 0.635 22 0.707 26 0.684 22 0.783 16 0.783 15
F35 1 0.065 49 0.339 45 0.070 50 0.089 49 0.089 49
F36 1 0.522 28 0.562 35 0.539 31 0.637 24 0.637 23
F37 2 0.307 40 0.646 31 0.348 42 0.383 40 0.383 39
F38 2 0.170 43 0.778 22 0.187 46 0.203 44 0.203 43
F39 2 0.419 33 0.793 21 0.564 29 0.600 26 0.594 26
F40 2 0.925 8 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1
F41 2 0.674 19 0.770 23 0.713 20 0.743 18 0.743 17
F42 2 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1
F43 2 0.122 45 0.838 19 0.192 45 0.171 45 0.170 44
F44 3 0.102 48 0.991 12 0.352 41 0.253 43 0.142 46
F45 3 0.040 50 1.000 1 1.000 10 0.089 50 0.045 50
F46 3 0.206 42 1.000 1 1.000 1 0.503 31 0.284 42
F47 3 0.503 29 0.973 13 0.845 16 1.000 1 0.596 25
F48 3 0.324 39 1.000 1 0.405 39 0.405 38 0.405 37
F49 3 0.959 7 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1
F50 3 0.777 14 1.000 1 1.000 1 0.980 11 0.980 10
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Table 2 Correlation coefficients between the performance measures obtained for the 20 simulated
ethical mutual funds with the different DEA models.
IDEA−1 IDEA−E IDEA−U IDEA−C IDEA−B
IDEA−1 1.000 0.273 0.664 0.941 0.985
IDEA−E 1.000 0.636 0.352 0.256
IDEA−U 1.000 0.727 0.655
IDEA−C 1.000 0.957
IDEA−B 1.000
Table 3 Correlation coefficients between the relative ranking of all the 50 simulated mutual
funds computed with the different DEA models.
IDEA−1 IDEA−E IDEA−U IDEA−C IDEA−B
IDEA−1 1.000 0.549 0.820 0.935 0.974
IDEA−E 1.000 0.811 0.640 0.591
IDEA−U 1.000 0.863 0.829
IDEA−C 1.000 0.970
IDEA−B 1.000
Another feature pointed out by the empirical results is that, as one can expect,
IDEA−1 gives the minimum efficiency score.
In order to verify how significant the differences among the various
performance measures are, Table 2 reports the values of the correlation coefficients
computed among the performance measures IDEA−1, IDEA−E , IDEA−U , IDEA−C ,
IDEA−B for all ethical funds. The correlation coefficients indicate that the
efficiency results obtained with the exogenously fixed output and the categorical
models are more correlated with the one-output model results than with the results
of the basic DEA model for ethical funds. Apparently, the basic two-output model
(4.2)-(4.3) gives much emphasis on the ethical level, thus raising the efficiency score
of the ethical funds maybe too much. As expected, the correlation between the
binary and the multiple categories models is very high.
Sometimes, one is interested in the relative ranking more than in the
performance value in itself; on the other hand, the rating of a fund may vary
even when the performance measure does not change while, in other cases, we
may observe the same rating even if the efficiency score is slightly modified. Table
3 presents the correlation coefficients among the relative rankings obtained with
the different DEA models for all the 50 funds analyzed. Although softened, the
differences pointed out in Table 2 can in substance be observed also in Table 3.
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8. Concluding remarks
We have proposed a few models which apply the DEA technique to the
measurement of the performance of ethical mutual funds. The models differ in the
nature of the ethical indicator, which can be either a measure of the ethical level
of the fund or a categorical variable. Moreover, the ethical level can sometimes
be considered as exogenously fixed and beyond the control of managers, and this
constraint has to be taken into account by the measurement procedure. Besides the
basic DEA model for ethical mutual fund performance measurement, we attain two
special models which take into account either the categorical nature of the ethical
level or the fact that the ethical level is fixed in advance and cannot be modified.
Finally, a special binary ethical/non-ethical case gives a peculiar categorical model.
The various models presented have been compared both from a theoretical
point of view and through an empirical analysis.
Of course, all these models can naturally be modified or extended by
considering other input or output variables, which allow to take account of other
aspects that may be useful in the comparison of ethical mutual funds.
Appendix
We report in this Appendix an outline of the proofs of Propositions 1-6.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 can be proved by comparing the constraints of the dual
problems of the input oriented linear programming problem equivalent to the
DEA problems (3.1)-(3.2) and (4.2)-(4.3): the constraints of the first one are a
subset of the constraints of the second one. Let us consider a two-phase linear
programming procedure (see e.g. Cooper, Seiford and Tone, 2000); then for both
dual minimization problems the performance measure coincides with the optimal
value of the same phase I objective function. Therefore, the problem with the
more restricted feasible region will have the higher efficiency score.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2 can be proved analogously to Proposition 1; when ej0 = 0 and
ej ≥ 0 for all j, the constraints of the dual of the input oriented problem equivalent
to the DEA problem (3.1)-(3.2) are a subset of the constraints of the dual of the
input oriented problem equivalent to the DEA problem (4.2)-(4.3), but the only
different constraint (connected to the ethical measure) is redundant, so that the
two problems have the same feasible regions.
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof of Proposition 3 is similar to the proof of Proposition 1 in Banker
and Morey (1986a) and rests on the comparison between the feasible region of the
dual of the output oriented linear programming problem equivalent to the DEA
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problem (4.2)-(4.3) and the feasible region of the dual of the linear programming
problem associated to a convenient transformation of the DEA problem (5.3)-(5.4)
(the DEA problem (5.3)-(5.4) can be equivalently written as a problem which
minimizes the input to output weighted ratio): the feasible region of the first
problem is included in the feasible region of the second one. On the other hand, for
both maximization problems the performance measure coincides with the inverse
of the optimal value of the dual variable z0, so that the problem with the more
restricted feasible region will have the higher value of 1/z0.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proposition 4 can be proved analogously to Proposition 3; it is sufficient to
note that when ej0 = 0 the constraints which define the feasible regions of the two
dual problems that are being compared are identical.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proposition 5 can be proved by comparing the feasible regions of the dual
output oriented linear programming problems (6.6)-(6.7) and (5.1)-(5.2); it suffices
to prove the first equality, as the second one follows from Proposition 4. It can be
observed that when ej0 = 0 the constraints which differ between the two problems
(connected to the ethical measure) are redundant, so that the feasible regions of
the two problems coincide.
Proof of Proposition 6
To prove the first part of Proposition 6 let us point out that the binary variable
d(3) in the multiple categories case takes value 0 for all the ethical funds and value
1 for the non-ethical funds, exactly as the variable d in the binary categorical
model, and constraint (6.4) is one of the constraints (6.7) . Hence, the constraints
of the binary problem (6.2)-(6.3) are a subset of the constraints of the multiple
categories problem (6.6)-(6.7). The inequality (6.9) then follows.
Moreover, for the non-ethical funds all the binary variables have value 1 and
the constraints which involve the binary values are redundant. Therefore, when
j0 is one of the non-ethical funds the two problems have the same feasible regions
and the equality (6.10) follows.
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